Hello everyone.
I promised u/existentialgoof to write a post about Johann Robeck, one of the most intriguing, and most influential, figures in the history of suicide. Here we go.
Introduction
Perhaps you have come across his name before. You might remember this passage from part 3 of Al Alvarez’s The Savage God: A Study of Suicide (1973; pp. 143–144 in my 2002 paperback edition):
First and most important, suicide is a closed world with its own irresistible logic. This is not to say that people commit suicide, as the Stoics did, coolly, deliberately, as a rational choice between rational alternatives. The Romans may have disciplined themselves into accepting this frigid logic but those who have done so in modern history are, in the last analysis, monsters. And like all monsters, they are hard to find. In 1735 John Robeck, a Swedish philosopher, completed a long Stoic defence of suicide as a just, right and desirable act; he then carefully put his principles into practice by giving away his property and drowning himself in the Weser. His death was the sensation of the day. It provoked Voltaire to comment, through one of the characters in Candide: ‘I have seen a prodigious number of people who hold their existence in execration; but I have only seen a dozen who voluntarily put an end to their misery, three negroes, four Englishmen, four Genevois, and a German professor called Robeck.’ Even for Voltaire, the supreme rationalist, a purely rational suicide was something prodigious and slightly grotesque.
The words quoted can be found in chapter 12 of Voltaire’s Candide, ou l’optimisme (Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol 48, p. 162), they are spoken by an old woman who, in spite of her pessimistic outlook on life and all the suffering she had to endure, clings to life.
Johann Robeck, his work and his fate are also mentioned in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, III, 21 (tr. Kenrick, pp. 159, 169):
You would have me apply to the test of reason: I will; let us reason. You desire me to deliberate in proportion to the importance of the question in debate; I agree to it. Let us investigate truth with temper and moderation; let us discuss this general proposition with the same indifference we should treat any other. Roebeck wrote an apology for suicide before he put an end end to his life. I will not, after his example, write a book on the subject, neither am I well satisfied with that which he has penned, but I hope in this discussion at least to imitate his moderation.
[…]
A strange letter this for the discussion of such a subject! Do men argue so coolly on a question of this nature, when they examine it on their own accounts? Is the letter a forgery, or does the author reason only with an intent to be refuted? What makes our opinion in this particular dubious, is the example of Robeck, which he cites, and which seems to warrant his own. Robeck deliberated so gravely, that he had patience to write a book, a large, voluminous, weighty, and dispassionate book; and when he had concluded, according to his principles, that it was lawful to put an end to our being, he destroyed himself with the same composure that he wrote. Let us beware of the prejudices of the times, and of particular countries. When suicide is out of fashion, we conclude that none but madmen destroy themselves; all the efforts of courage appear chimerical to dastardly minds; every one judges of others by himself. Nevertheless, how many instances are there, well attested, of men, in every other respect perfectly discreet, who, without remorse, rage, or despair, have quitted life for no other reason than because it was a burthen to them, and have died with more composure than they lived.
So, who is this guy, this early advocate of a right to die, this shining example of rational suicide? Let me tell you: Most information you can find on him, both in printed publications and on the internet (including the English Wikipedia entry), is very unreliable. (People can’t even get his name and his year of death right…) Was he German or Swedish? What was his profession? And, most importantly, what did he actually have to say about suicide?
I have done a lot of research on him, and I’ve got to set a few things straight here. Let me start with a brief overview of his life.
Biography
Johan(n) Robeck (note: some Swedish sources give his name as Jonas) was born in Kalmar, Sweden, on September 13, 1672, in a distinguished and respectable family: His father, Matt(h)ias Robeck, was the mayor of the town. He enjoyed a good upbringing, and his exceptional talents didn’t go unnoticed. He studied theology and philosophy for ten years at the university of Uppsala, Sweden. He wrote a philosophical dissertation, which he sought to defend, but, for reasons unknown, he was not permitted to do so. Frustrated, he left his native Sweden and went to Germany.
Robeck converted to Catholicism in Hildesheim, Germany, and joined the Jesuit order in 1705. He became a priest and rose to pretty high ranks, and he spent the next three decades carrying out various missions throughout Europe for the Jesuit order and the Catholic church, eventually settling in 1727 near my hometown of Hamburg, Germany. He did not, however, return to Sweden.
In 1734, Robeck left the Jesuit order and came to the town of Rinteln, Germany, in order to devote himself to his studies, especially of the Stoics, at the local university (which, by the way, closed in 1810) under Professor Johann Nicolaus Funck (1698–1778). During this time, he buried himself in his books, became a recluse, and rarely even left his room. After spending a year in Rinteln, Robeck wrote a letter to Funck, announcing he was going to undertake a final journey, citing health reasons (“an excess of black bile”). He donated most of his books and manuscripts and some money to the library and gave away most of his possessions, and, though they had not been very close, he tasked Funck with publishing one of his works and sent him the money for the printing expenses. Thus, Robeck set out for Bremen, Germany, taking only a modest suitcase with a couple of personal belongings with him. But once he arrived in Bremen, on June 17, 1735, he sent those back to Funck and, in a final letter, advised him to give them to the poor.
Then Robeck reportedly, wearing his finest clothes, rented a small boat, and, to the dismay of the bystanders, departed from the shore alone. Three days later, his corpse was found in the river Weser, about three miles from the city, and buried in a nearby village.
Upon receiving these news, Funck decided to print what would be Robeck’s famous defence of suicide. Funck was confronted with the difficult task of editing the controversial work of an esteemed colleague he fundamentally disagreed with, but, fulfilling his wish, he added an index, as well as a 52-page preface and a lot of annotations, which often take up most of the page, to try to refute Robeck’s arguments. The book was published in the following year.
- Iohannis Robeck Calmaria–Suedi exercitatio philosophica de εὐλόγῳ ἐξαγωγῇ, sive morte voluntaria philosophorum et bonorum virorum, etiam Iudaeorum et Christianorum. Recensuit, perpetuis animadversionibus notavit, praefatus est et indicem rerum locupletissimum addidit Ioh. Nicolaus Funccius Marburgensis. Rintelii 1736. (LII + 319 + 20 pp.) (Scan)
Funck’s preface includes a biographical section (pp. I–X), also quoting Robeck’s letters, and this is probably the only reliable primary source we have on Robeck’s biography.
Some 17 years later, in 1753, Funck edited another one of Robeck’s manuscripts. This was, essentially, the second part of his treatise – not just a new edition with a different title, as this biography claims. Again, Funck added an index and a lot of annotations as well as an essay on the causes of suicide.
- Iohannis Robeck Calmaria–Suedi de morte voluntaria exercitatio, sive examen calumniarum, nugarum et fallaciarum, quibus tanquam argumentis utuntur εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς consensus generis humani, salutis et gloriae bonorum virorum honestarumque feminarum hostes et oppugnatores. Perpetuis animadversionibus notavit, praefatus est et indicem rerum addidit Iohannes Nicolaus Funccius Marburgensis. Marburgi 1753. (36 + 384 + 16 pp.) (Scan 1, Scan 2)
Let us now take a look at the work itself.
Part I
After some preliminary reflections and discussions, Robeck presents twelve arguments for the moral permissibility of voluntary death. I will attempt to give a brief outline of these here:
- [pp. 101–102] The utter weakness and ridiculousness of his opponents’ arguments.
- [pp. 102–123] There is no actual law that obliges us to love life so much that we may under no circumstances end it. A love for the good is innate in us, but it is not the cardinal rule of our actions. Instincts themselves do not yet constitute a law; laws are usually contrary to instincts. We are endowed with reason to control our animal nature. Self-love is older and stronger than what could be prescribed by law, and therefore, such a law would be redundant. The love of bodily life is the source of all sins and vices. — The commandment to love our neighbours as ourselves does not actually command self-love, which is presupposed and only serves as some kind of benchmark. Self-love even remains in those who choose voluntary death, some people even killed themselves out of self-love. Christ declares only the love of God and the love of neighbour to be the most important commandments, not the love of oneself, and only by virtue of the other two, self-love becomes reasonable. As with vice, sad consequences are connected to the act of committing suicide, but, likewise, also with not committing suicide.
- [pp. 124–138] Unlike with animals, the love of life is not the primary driving force for thoughts, decisions and deliberate acts, and not the aim which they are, or should be, directed at. It is merely subordinate to the “main love” of happiness (εὐδαιμονία), and this type of love is peculiar to rational beings. We do not love happiness for the sake of life, but we love life as a means to achieve the supreme good of happiness. Thus, if life is only a means of unhappiness, it is not worth preserving. If we are allowed, in many cases, to kill others, why not ourselves?
- [pp. 139–142] The body itself has very little value, it only receives its value through its use, and it is preserved for this reason alone. If it becomes harmful and corrupted, it may be disposed of and destroyed, like other things of this kind; it would perish anyway after a short time due to its perishable nature.
- [pp. 143–156] Though philosophers have come to different conclusions about the soul, life and its purpose, nevertheless, according to all it is permissible to take one’s own life for “just and necessary” reasons. Regardless of whether the soul is simple or complex, immortal or mortal, it is always the highest and most excellent good. (Remember, guys: Главное это душа!) The body, when compared to the soul, is inferior and merely a tool, and often a useless one, often a hindrance, burden, fetters, and pain. If the soul, too, is material and mortal, then it is foolish for one, when a painful and shameful death is imminent, not to choose an easy and honourable one; if the soul is immaterial and immortal, then it is not necessary to choose a death with long agonies rather than a milder and shorter one. Likewise, it is not necessary to let oneself be abused and then killed rather than dying without disgrace by one’s own hand. Regarding the highest good, all philosophers agree that it is not life itself, but something else, for example, virtue (perfected reason), the absence of pain, etc.
- [pp. 157–164] When benefits stop being beneficial, and when they start being useless, harmful and painful, and when you can barely keep them without losing virtue, then it does not make sense to force someone to keep those, or prevent them from disposing of those. God is not such a tyrant. We should, in fact, ask ourselves the question if death is, perhaps, even preferable to life as it is; many wise authors, both Christian and Pagan, have expressed a preference for death.
- [pp. 164–166] Whatever can be said against voluntary death, could also be said against self-defense, that is, defending one’s life, one’s chastity, or one’s property by killing an attacker. This kind of self-defence also seems to be inconsistent with the commandments not to kill, to love one’s neighbour as oneself, to lay down one’s life for others, to resist injustice, to regard God as the master of life, to expel no one from the ‘station of life’, etc.
- [pp. 167–170] In certain cases, killing oneself is in accordance with perfect reason, which is above all laws and all human authority, which judges good and evil, which is in accordance with both Nature and itself immutable, and which deserves no less respect and authority than the Holy Scripture, and more obedience than the orders of the powers that be, as it is the highest good humans can act on. It does not, however, demand that humans, under all circumstances, including the most horrible ones, continue living, as the previous arguments and refutations have shown.
- [pp. 171–178] Voluntary death is the protection of natural laws, of virtues and of duties, a pillar of freedom, tranquillity, and happiness, as far as these are attainable, and master over necessity; it dismantles the excuses of shamefulness, it reveals the effects of superstition, cowardice, and excessive love of life, all of which try to hide themselves.
- [pp. 178–300] There are countless examples among all peoples (Greeks, Romans, Asians, and Africans) that, through their expressed opinions, customs, and institutions, approve of such a death. There is no nation among which it would be considered forbidden to kill oneself without harm to others, for a good, just, important, and necessary cause. If anything, those who did it, are seen as great, useful, and honourable examples of a brave soul that despises life and death, while those who allowed themselves to suffer most shameful things are seen as degenerate and cowardly.
- [pp. 301–306] If one is not allowed to end one’s life if there is a good reason to do so, then the use of life, wisdom, and virtue would be significantly reduced, if not eliminated altogether. One would have to abandon oneself to the wantonness and abuse of the fools and the wicked.
- [pp. 307–319] The option of voluntary death is, for a wise and brave person, a strong motivation for excellent deeds; life, if you are required to keep it no matter what, is a hindrance for such deeds. Superstitious and cowardly people will, with their words, sayings, pretenses, interpretations, and threats, never be able to overcome the common human nature; and those that have a shameful and sorrowful life ahead of them, the end of which they must expect, but not bring about themselves, will not, by themselves, refuse the option of voluntary death, unless the means are taken away from them. For example, Samson’s most glorious deed was his final one, which overshadows all other actions in his life, as the Holy Scripture makes clear by stating that, in his death, he has killed more enemies than in his life. If you take voluntary death away, then all of that last glory of Samson, the enemies’ death and sorrow, the friends’ joy, and the welfare of the fatherland would be taken away along with it.
Part II
In this treatise, Robeck focusses on refuting common objections and counter-arguments made by those who deny that there is voluntary death is, or can be, morally permissible – in particular Lactantius, Augustine, Lipsius, and Rachelius. However, at the end of the work (pp. 378–379), Robeck also explains in which cases he believes suicide is not permissible:
Addo demum et adversariis concedo, atque severius etiam, quam ipsi, damno necem non sui modo, sed et aliorum, imo vel pecudis, si temere, inconsulte, promiscue, ex ira, odio, furore, crudelitate et quocunque vitio, malove impetu vel affectu fiat. […] Damno etiam, si quis se vel educat, vel occidat, dum Deo, patriae, civibus, proximis utiliter servire potest: praesertim sine intolerabili, aut graviore tormento sui. Confiteor hunc talem peccare, facereque aliquam quasi iniuriam Deo, et illis quibus prodesse posset vivus. Quod si nihil aliud velint urgeantque adversarii, lis omnis est finita; imo nulla ab initio fuit.
“Finally, I add and concede to my opponents, and, even more harshly than they themselves, I condemn murder not only of oneself, but also of others, indeed, even of cattle, if it is done without good cause, without due care and consideration, without distinction, out of anger, hate, rage, cruelty, and any vice, or bad impulse or passion. […] I also condemn, if someone ‘releases’, or kills, themself, while they can still serve God, their fatherland, fellow citizens, and close ones in a useful way: especially (if it happens) without unbearable or greater torment. I admit: Such a one sins and commits some kind of injustice against God and those to whom they could be of use while they were alive. Therefore, if my opponents want and press nothing else, then the whole debate is settled, in fact, there has never been one from the start.” (my own translation)
Conclusion
Johann Robeck may have been an odd person, but he was an extremely learned man. He dedicated most of his life to his extensive philosophical and theological studies and was held in high regard by his peers. He was not shy to show his vast knowledge and erudition, and he often cites passages from Christian, Greek and Roman authors as well as from contemporary scholars. Robeck draws a lot on Stoic philosophy, especially on Seneca’s 70th epistle. Some, as we have seen, describe his style as cold and rational, others as impassionated or even enthusiastic, and, of course, his own biases shine through here and there. It is true that the structure of the work seems somewhat convoluted at times. But one thing is for sure: He was very serious about the subject and his position, and even his most vehement critics praised the elegance of his Latin and his level of erudition.
Robeck’s work was a major contribution to the discussion of the ethics of suicide in the age of Enlightenment. Before him, there had been, for example, John Donne (1572–1631), who had already written an infamous book entitled Βιαθάνατος [Biathanatos]: A Declaration of that Paradox, or Thesis, that Self-homicide is not so Naturally Sin, that it may never be otherwise. Wherein the Nature, and the extent of all those Laws, which seem to be violated by this Act, are diligently surveyed, which was published posthumously in 1648, some 40 years after its composition, and offered an attempt to “descandalize” the phenomenon of suicide. Remarkably, Donne himself confessed: “I have often such a sickly inclination”. A few years after Robeck, perhaps following in his footsteps, David Hume (1711–1776) wrote his influential essay “On Suicide” (1755).
I believe Robeck’s work is definitely worth reading and deserves to reach a wider audience. Unfortunately, it is written entirely in Latin – but, fortunately, I am fluent in Latin. I have already transcribed both books, save for Funck’s annotations, which took me a couple of months. I am currently proof-reading the whole thing and looking for a way to adapt his 18th century orthography and formatting to somewhat more readable standards. Once that is done, I am thinking about translating the work into English. This will require even more time and effort than my Kurnig project, but please let me know if you’re interested, or if you would like to help.
Edit: Here is my work in progress file of the Latin text.
Thank you for reading.
originally posted on Reddit [2022-12-01]
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